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Abstract: I negoziati post-Brexit ed il criterio del level playing field – On 31 January 
2020, the United Kingdom left the European Union and phase two of Brexit, which will be 
dedicated to the definition of the future relations between the Parties, officially started. This 
contribution presents the main features of the future trade relations between the UK and the 
EU, as they emerge from phase one of Brexit. Then, it analyzes two paradigms (market 
integration and trade liberalization) and four relevant models, which currently link the EU 
to some of its most important commercial partners, namely Norway, Switzerland, Turkey 
and Canada. Finally, it focuses on the “level playing field” criterion, which relates to the 
standards to be applied by the Parties in their future relations with regard to competition 
policy and State aids, environmental protection, social and labor standards, fiscal policies. 
Keywords: Brexit; European Union; Withdrawal Agreement; Political Declaration; Level 
playing field. 
1. Introduction  
The Brexit saga, which began with the referendum of 23 June 2016, reached its 
first conclusion on 31 January 2020, more than three and a half years later, when 
the United Kingdom finally left the European Union. On that date, phase one of 
Brexit, characterized by the negotiations foreseen by article 50 TEU on setting 
out the arrangements for the withdrawal of a Member State from the Union, was 
over. At the same time, phase two of Brexit, regarding the negotiations between 
the Parties for the definition of their future relations, started. This new 
negotiation phase should last until the end of the transition period provided for 
in the Withdrawal Agreement, currently set for 31 December 20201. 
 
1 On the Brexit see among others: P. Mariani, G. Sacerdoti, Brexit and Trade Issues, in EJLS 
Special Issue, October 2019, 187-218; M. Montini, Le future relazioni commerciali tra Regno 
Unito e Unione europea dopo la Brexit: paradigmi e modelli a confronto, in Federalismi.it, 20, 2019, 
29-49; F. Savastano, Uscire dall’Unione europea. Brexit e il diritto di recedere dai Trattati, 
Torino, 2019; A. Tanca, Brexit: l’esito di una relazione problematica, in Quaderni costituzionali, 
2018, 341-360; M. Dougan, An Airbag for the Crash Test Dummies? EU-UK Negotiations For A 
Post-Withdrawal “Status Quo” Transitional Regime under Article 50 TEU, in Common Market 
Law Review, 55(3), 2018, 57-100; T. Tridimas, Article 50: An Endgame without an End?, in 
King's Law Journal, 27(3), 2016, 297-313; D. Dixon, Article 50 and Member State Sovereignty, 
in German Law Journal, 19(4), 2018, 901-940; M. Puglia, Art. 50 TUE, in A. Tizzano (a cura 
di), Trattati dell’Unione europea, Milano, 2014, 338 ff.; P. Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the 
European Union: A Tipology of Effects, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
20(2), 2013, 209-219; A. Di Rienzo, Art. 50 TUE, in C. Curti Gialdino (a cura di), Codice 
Massimiliano Montini Saggi – DPCE online, 2020/1 
ISSN: 2037-6677 
170 
The negotiations for phase two look quite hard and complex. However, 
they do not start from the scratch. They will be rather based on what the Parties 
have already agreed in the Withdrawal Agreement and in the Political 
Declaration. Both documents are the result of the negotiations between the 
Parties that began in the aftermath of the withdrawal notification sent by the 
United Kingdom to the European Union, pursuant to article 50 TEU, on 29 
March 2017. The two Parties agreed on the Withdrawal Agreement, and the 
related Political Declaration, on 13 November 2018. However, the British 
Parliament refused to ratify the two aforementioned acts despite being pledged 
by the Government chaired by Theresa May. As a consequence, following the 
appointment of a new Government chaired by Boris Johnson, in summer 2019, 
the negotiations between the Parties were re-opened and the two documents 
were revised. The new updated versions of the Withdrawal Agreement and the 
Political Declaration were finally adopted by the Parties on 17 October 2019. 
This contribution will focus on the main features of the future trade 
relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union, as they emerge 
from the most relevant documents that marked the negotiations between the 
Parties in the period between the withdrawal notification sent by the United 
Kingdom to the European Union in March 2017 and the conclusion of the 
revised version of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration 
which occurred in October 2019. 
Subsequently, the analysis will be devoted to the description of the two 
paradigms that constitute the reference points in the negotiations for the 
definition of future commercial relations between the Parties. These paradigms 
represent two different, and somehow opposed, visions. They correspond on the 
one hand to the imperative of market integration and on the other to the one of 
trade liberalization. The two paradigms constitute the reference points normally 
used by the European Union to define its commercial relations with third 
countries. Therefore, the analysis of the paradigms will be followed by an 
examination of some of the most relevant models, which have been drawn up in 
implementation of the two aforementioned paradigms. These models currently 
link the Union to some of its most important commercial partners, located both 
inside and outside the European continent. 
Finally, the last part of this contribution will concentrate on the question 
of the “level playing field” criterion, with a specific focus on the issue of the 
definition of the standards which may be applied by the Parties in their future 
relations with regard to competition policy and State aids, environmental 
protection, social and labor standards, fiscal policies. 
 
dell’Unione europea operativo, Napoli, 2012, 404 ff.; G. Busia, Revisione del Trattato, ammissione 
di nuovi Stati e recesso dall’Unione, in F. Bassanini, G. Tiberi (a cura di), Le nuove istituzioni 
europee. Commento al Trattato di Lisbona, Bologna, 2010, 401 ff.; H. Hofmeister, Should I stay 
or Should I go? – A Critical Analysis of the Right to withdraw from the EU, in European Law 
Journal, 16(5), 2010, 589-603. 
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2. The main features of the future trade relations between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union 
In this paragraph the main features of the future trade relations between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union will be presented. The analysis will 
focus firstly on the most relevant documents that shaped the negotiations 
between the Parties during phase one of Brexit, up to the conclusion of the 
revised version of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration in 
October 2019. Then, the attention will shift to the documents containing the 
negotiating positions of the two Parties, published in February 2020, which 
marked the beginning of phase two of Brexit. 
The analysis ought to start from the withdrawal notification sent from the 
United Kingdom to the European Union on 29 March 2017, which officially gave 
the start to the withdrawal procedure regulated by article 50 TEU, following the 
outcome of the British referendum on Leave vs. Remain of 23 June 20162. 
In the letter of notification, the United Kingdom declares its intention not 
to remain connected to the European single market, while recognizing the 
indivisibility of the four freedoms of movement (goods, people, services and 
capital). The United Kingdom proposes a series of principles which should guide 
the negotiations with the European Union, making a reference to the necessity 
to negotiate in a constructive and respectful way and “in a spirit of sincere 
cooperation”. The main objective of the United Kingdom is to establish a “deep 
and special relationship” between the two Parties, which should include 
cooperation in economic and security matters3. 
From the European Union's point of view, the first relevant document to 
be analyzed consists of the “Guidelines” of the European Council of 29 April 
2017, which contain the negotiating directives adopted by the Heads of State and 
Government of the Member States of the Union to steer the positions of the 
European Commission during the subsequent negotiation phase4. 
In the “Guidelines”, the European Council notes the positive attitude of the 
United Kingdom aimed at establishing a “close relationship” with the European 
Union after Brexit, but at the same time clearly affirms that no kind of future 
agreement between the Parties should create a situation equivalent to a (total or 
partial) participation by the United Kingdom in the European single market, as 
this could hinder its integrity and proper functioning5.  
Furthermore, it clarifies that the future agreement between the Parties 
should include provisions aimed at protecting European companies from any 
competitive advantages that British companies may enjoy in the future, if the 
United Kingdom was to decide to lower its tax, social, environmental and 
regulatory measures and practices as compared to those applicable in the 
 
2 United Kingdom Notification under Article 50 TEU, data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/XT-20001-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
3 Ibidem, 2. 
4 Special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017) – Guidelines, EUCO XT 
20004/17. 
5 Ibidem, para. 18-20. 
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European Union. The Parties, in defining their future commercial relations, 
should mutually commit to ensuring the application of similar or comparable 
standards to the economic and commercial entities operating in competition in 
each other’s territory6. 
On the basis of the positions expressed by the Parties in the documents 
examined above and during the initial phase of the negotiations, the so-called 
“red lines” for the negotiations emerged, that correspond to the apparently “non-
negotiable” points and thresholds adopted by each of the Parties. The relevance 
of such “red lines” with regard to the definition of the main features of their 
future commercial relations was well summarized by Michel Barnier, the chief 
negotiator of the European Union, in a speech held at the meeting of the 
European Council of 15 December 20177. 
According to Barnier's reconstruction, the analysis of the negotiating 
positions of the United Kingdom and the European Union, paired with the 
experience gained by the Union in the definition of various bilateral agreements 
with some of its most important commercial partners globally, leads to the 
conclusion that the only models that may realistically work as useful references 
for the definition of the future trade relations between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union are the free trade agreements concluded by the Union in 
recent years with Canada and South Korea8. 
Despite the differences between the Parties and the narrow negotiation 
margins represented by the “red lines” mentioned above, following an intense 
year of negotiations, the Parties agreed on 13 November 2018 on the first 
version of the Withdrawal Agreement and the related Political Declaration. 
While the first document deals mainly with regulating relations between the 
Parties during the transition period, foreseen between the effective date of exit of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union and the deadline of 31 December 
20209, the second document is more relevant for the purposes of this analysis, as 
it contains some relevant elements on the indicative main features of the future 
relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union10. 
In particular, the Political Declaration on the one hand takes up some of 
the issues corresponding to the negotiating red lines of the Parties mentioned 
above and on the other hand contains some indicative hints on how to shape the 
future trade relations between the Parties11. 
 
6 Ibidem, para. 20. 
7 M. Barnier, European Commission Chief Negotiator to the Heads of State and Government 
at the European Council (Article 50), 15 December 2017, ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
sites/beta political/files/slide_presented_by_barnier_at_euco_15-12-2017.pdf 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2019/C 
144 I/01), Official Journal of the European Union C 144 I/1, 25 April 2019, 1–184. 
10 Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom (2019/C 66 I/02), Official Journal of the 
European Union C 66I, 19 February 2019, 185–198. 
11 Ibidem, paras. 4 and 17. 
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More precisely, in paragraph 4 of the Political Declaration, the Parties 
state that their future relationships should be based “on a balance between rights 
and obligations that takes into account the principles of each party”. These 
principles seem to coincide with some of the already mentioned red lines for 
negotiation adopted by each of the two Parties. For the European Union, the 
principles of the integrity of the single market and the customs union, as well as 
the indivisibility of the four freedoms, are specifically mentioned. For the United 
Kingdom, the main principles refer to the respect for its sovereignty and the 
protection of its internal market, as well as to its right to develop an independent 
commercial policy and to end the regime of free movement of persons between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union, in accordance with the results of 
the 2016 referendum. 
Subsequently, in paragraph 17 of the Political Declaration, the Parties 
indicate the proposed main characteristics of their future commercial relations. 
These consist in particular of an “ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced 
economic partnership”, which should firstly include a “free trade area”, in which 
goods can circulate freely, without quotas and without tariffs, and a facilitated 
investments regime. Secondly, it is stated that the partnership should give rise to 
“wider sectoral cooperation, where it is in the mutual interest of both Parties.” 
This reference indicates a common fundamental interest of the Parties not to 
limit their future cooperation only to the exchange of goods. However, the future 
sectoral cooperation between the Parties, rather than being automatic or general, 
should be subject to specific negotiations. The Parties also agree that the 
provisions of their future agreement should guarantee a “level playing field” for 
open and fair competition, with the aim to guarantee equal or comparable 
conditions to their respective economic and commercial entities. 
Beyond the specific indications contained in paragraph 17, from the 
systemic reading of the Political Declaration it emerges that the “ambitious 
economic partnership” between the Parties should be based primarily on the free 
movement of goods and on the facilitation of investments. Only to a more limited 
extent, the Parties have shown their interest in the free movement of services. 
Furthermore, the Parties have declared their willingness to allow some limited 
forms of temporary entry and stay of natural persons for professional reasons 
only, in sectors that will have to be defined specifically. In addition to this, the 
Parties have declared their interest in ensuring the free movement of capital and 
payments associated with the movement of goods and services that will be 
subject to liberalization as part of their future economic partnership. Finally, 
with specific reference to the free movement of persons, the Parties, in view of 
the clear position of the United Kingdom aimed at ending the free movement of 
persons applicable in the European single market, stated their interest in 
pursuing negotiations to establish some “mobility arrangements” for persons. 
These should be based on the principle of non-discrimination and on the full 
reciprocity of rights and obligations between the Parties. Within the framework 
of the proposed “mobility  arrangements”, the adoption of specific provisions 
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aimed at guaranteeing the exemption of visas for short-term visits, as well as 
facilitated conditions of entry and stay for specific purposes, such as research, 
study, training and youth exchanges, should be considered12. 
In sum, it may be noted that the Political Declaration, in its original 
version of November 2018, already included some hints on the main features of 
the future commercial relations between the Parties. However, after the 
resignation of Theresa May and the appointment of the new Government of 
Boris Johnson, the negotiations between the Parties were “reopened” in the 
summer of 2019. The outcome of the resumed negotiations was the conclusion of 
a revised version of both the Withdrawal Agreement13 and the Political 
Declaration14, which were adopted by the Parties on 17 October 2019. For the 
purpose of the present analysis, however, it should be underlined that the revised 
version of the Withdrawal Agreement, similarly to the original one, did not 
contain any specific element on the shaping of the future trade relations between 
the Parties, whereas the relevant features originally included in the Political 
Declaration remained substantially unchanged in its revised version. For these 
reasons, it is not necessary to examine in detail the new version of the Political 
Declaration.  
The matter of the proposed main features of the future trade relations 
between the Parties was revived in February 2020, when the official documents 
on the negotiating positions of the European Union and the United Kingdom for 
phase two of Brexit were published. 
The negotiating directives of the European Union are contained in the 
Council Decision of 25 February 202015. As to their relevant content, paragraph 
7 should be mentioned in the first place. It states that the main goal of the post-
Brexit negotiations is to establish a new broad partnership with the United 
Kingdom, covering the areas of interest indicated in the Political Declaration, 
including trade and economic cooperation as well as some other sectors, such as 
cooperation in criminal matters, foreign policy, security and defense. The 
partnership between the Parties should form a coherent structure and should be 
embedded in an overall governance framework16. 
With reference to the content of the planned partnership, the Union’s 
negotiating directives contain a series of principles on which cooperation 
between the Parties should be based. From the Union’s point of view, the 
envisaged partnership should guarantee a “balance of rights and obligations” and 
ensure the autonomy of the Union’s decision-making and legal order. Moreover, 
 
12 Ibidem, paras. 48-57. 
13 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2019/C 
384 I/01), Official Journal of the European Union, C 384I, 12 November 2019, 1-177. 
14 Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom (2019/C 66 I/02), Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 384I, 12 November 2019, 178–193. 
15 Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement, 25 February 2020, 
5870/20 ADD 1 REV 3. 
16 Ibidem, para. 7. 
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it should comply with the relevant guidelines expressed by the European 
Council, with a particular reference to the integrity of the single market and the 
customs union and the indivisibility of the four freedoms17. 
The economic partnership between the Parties should be wide-ranging and 
should include a free trade agreement accompanied by sectoral cooperation 
where this will be in the interest of the Union, provided that compliance with a 
high “level playing field” is guaranteed in the current and future standards 
adopted by the Parties18. The free trade area should provide for the total absence 
of tariff and non-tariff obstacles and should be connected to a customs and 
regulatory cooperation system between the Parties. Furthermore, it should be 
accompanied by strong reciprocal commitments of the Parties for the 
enforcement of high standards in the respective competition policy19. 
The negotiating positions of the United Kingdom for the post-Brexit 
negotiations are outlined in a document on the future relationship with the 
European Union issued by the British Government at the end of February 
202020. From this document, it emerges that the vision of the UK with respect to 
the future relations with the EU aims at the establishment of a friendly 
cooperation between sovereign states, in which both Parties should respect one’s 
another legal autonomy21. 
The United Kingdom reiterates that the reference parameters for defining 
the future relations between the Parties are those contained in the Political 
Declaration of 17 October 2019. These contemplate the conclusion of a 
comprehensive free trade agreement, drawn up along the lines of the recent free 
trade agreements concluded by the European Union with Canada and some 
other non-European countries. Such a free trade agreement should be 
accompanied by a series of other international agreements relating to specific 
sectors, such as fisheries, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, transport and energy22. 
As for the specific features that the free trade agreement should have, 
according to the United Kingdom this should provide for liberalized access to 
the respective internal markets for goods originating in the territories of the two 
Contracting Parties and should be largely based on the relevant WTO 
provisions, such as those on technical barriers to trade (TBT agreement) and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS agreement)23. The agreement should 
also include provisions aimed at facilitating trade in services, including the entry 
and temporary stay of people in connection with the provision of services, as well 
as at promoting investments24. In addition, the agreement should provide for a 
 
17 Ibidem, para. 10. 
18 Ibidem, para. 17. 
19 Ibidem, para. 19-20. 
20 HM Government, The Future Relationship with the EU. The UK’s Approach to 
Negotiations, CP211, February 2020. 
21 Ibidem, para. 5. 
22 Ibidem, Part 2, Chapter 1. 
23 Ibidem, Part 1, Chapters 1-7. 
24 Ibidem, Part 1, Chapters 8-10. 
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pathway for mutual recognition of professional qualifications25. Finally, the 
Parties should commit to some sort of free movement of capital and payments, as 
facilitative elements for promoting trade and investment26. Notably, in the 
United Kingdom’s negotiating positions there is no reference at all to the 
mobility of persons. 
In its negotiating positions for phase two of Brexit, the United Kingdom 
has officially declared that it will not extend the transition period beyond 31 
December 202027. According to the UK, if an agreement with the European 
Union will not be concluded by that date, the commercial relations between the 
two Parties will be governed by the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement 
and will be similar to Australia’s28. In this regard, it should be emphasized that 
in the aftermath of Brexit, the United Kingdom and Australia have announced 
their intention to conclude a free trade agreement shortly. The precise terms of 
such a foreseen agreement are not known yet. In any case, what is certain is that, 
in the event that the United Kingdom and the European Union fail to reach a 
trade agreement by the end of the transition period, their trade relations will be 
governed by WTO rules. 
With the aim to better understand the foreseeable main features of the 
future relations between the Parties, in the next paragraph the attention will 
shift to the analysis of the two most important paradigms and of some relevant 
models of free trade agreements concluded by the European Union in the recent 
past that could influence the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union in phase two of Brexit. 
3. Paradigms and models for the future trade relations between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union 
In this paragraph, the two main paradigms that normally inspire the Union’s 
relations with its trade counterparts will be examined. These paradigms 
correspond on the one hand to the imperative of market integration and on the 
other to the one of trade liberalization29. Subsequently, the analysis will focus on 
the main features of some relevant models experimented by the European Union 
with its most important commercial partners, located both inside and outside the 
European territory. In this context, four different models will be highlighted. 
They have been selected on the basis of their particular relevance as possible 
sources of inspiration for the definition of the future commercial relations 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union. The relevant models are 
 
25 Ibidem, Part 1, Chapter 12. 
26 Ibidem, Part 1, Chapter 18. 
27 Ibidem, Introduction, para. 9. 
28 Ibidem, Introduction, para. 7. 
29 P. Eeckhout, Future trade relations between the EU and the UK: options after Brexit, European 
Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department for 
External Relations, PE 603.866, March 2018, 6-16, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ 
etudes/STUD/2018/603866/EXPO_STU(2018)603866_EN.pdf 
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the following ones: the Norwegian model; the Swiss model; the Turkish model 
and the Canadian model30. 
The market integration paradigm has as its main objective the 
approximation of the technical regulation of the Parties. This objective can be 
achieved both through a centralized approach (which promotes harmonization 
“from above” of regulatory and technical standards) and through a decentralized 
approach (which promotes regulatory and technical convergence “from below” 
through the use of the principle of mutual recognition). In the context of the 
European internal market, the two approaches coexist. In some cases, the EU 
prefers to use the centralized approach (for example in the field of public health 
and safety of products and production processes), while in other cases European 
legislation allows Member States to adopt and maintain different national 
regulatory systems (for example with reference to some traditional products or 
production processes). In the latter circumstance, on the basis of the mutual 
recognition principle, each Member State must recognize, as equivalent to its 
own, the standards of the other countries and must guarantee the free circulation 
within its national territory of products legitimately manufactured and placed on 
the market in other Member States, which are based on different (but equivalent) 
national laws and regulations. In such cases, the possibility for a Member State 
to impose some limited restrictions on the free movement of goods in cases 
where there is the need to protect some of its fundamental national interests (the 
so-called “imperative requirements”) is always ensured. The relevant national 
interests may refer, for instance, to public health, environmental protection or 
consumer protection, to the extent that the requirements invoked are based on 
overriding public interests reasons and do not relate to fields for which 
European legislation has dictated a common harmonized discipline. 
In the context of the European Union, the market integration paradigm 
experienced in the context of the European single market is also strengthened by 
the application of the principles of direct effect and primacy. These principles, 
coming into play in the event of a conflict between European and national 
legislation, are meant to guarantee the supremacy of European Union law. In 
addition, the correct functioning of the European single market is ensured by the 
constant monitoring of the behavior of the Member States by the European 
Commission and by a dispute resolution system which guarantees the uniform 
and correct application of European Union law. 
The paradigm of market integration not only characterizes the European 
single market, but also strongly permeates the economic and commercial 
relations of the European Union with some of its neighboring European 
countries, which despite not being Member States, enjoy strong commercial and 
institutional links with the Union. In this sense, one should consider, for 
example, the cases of Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 
 
30 M. Montini, Le future relazioni commerciali tra Regno Unito e Unione europea dopo la 
Brexit: paradigmi e modelli a confronto, cit., spec. 37 ff. 
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Some details on the main features of the market integration models that 
characterize the commercial relations of the European Union with the 
aforementioned countries will be provided below, in order to verify how the 
paradigm of market integration is articulated and operates in these three 
contexts, which share significant similarities, but also have important differences. 
The Norwegian model refers to the commercial cooperation regime 
established under the 1993 Agreement on the European Economic Area (usually 
referred to as the EEA Agreement, from the English acronym European 
Economic Area).31 This is due to the fact that Norway represents the most 
economically relevant country among the three countries of the EFTA 
(European Free Trade Area), namely Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, which are 
linked by the EEA agreement to those of the European Union. 
The EEA establishes a free trade area between the European internal 
market and the national markets of the three countries in question. In this 
context, customs duties are abolished for products originating in the Contracting 
Parties. This integration of the respective markets is accompanied by a high 
degree of regulatory integration between the countries involved. In fact, the 
three aforementioned countries have an obligation to implement the technical 
standards that are part of the so-called acquis communautaire into their national 
legislation. However, despite having to comply with the technical regulations 
and standards imposed by the European Union, they do not have the opportunity 
to participate in their adoption or revision, which remains a matter of exclusive 
EU competence. This represents an important shortcoming of the EEA 
Agreement, which shows a serious deficit of democratic participation in its 
decision-making process.32 
The integration model envisaged by the EEA Agreement is very similar to 
the one in place in the European internal market, In fact, it may be said that the 
EEA Agreement extends to the European Economic Area, in a more or less 
similar way, the four freedoms of movement (goods, people, services, capital) 
already present in the European internal market.33  
The Swiss model refers not to a specific agreement, but to a complex 
system of economic and commercial agreements that connect the European 
Union and Switzerland.34 There is no general cooperation agreement between 
the EU and Switzerland, at least so far. In fact, a framework agreement between 
the Parties – called the Institutional Agreement – is currently under negotiation, 
and the Parties may eventually agree on its terms. There are, however, a series 
of sectoral agreements covering various fields, which have the main objective of 
 
31 Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement), in GUUE L 1, 3 January 
1994, 3 ff. 
32 H. Haukeland Fredriksen, C.N.K. Franklin, Of pragmatism and principles: The EEA 
Agreement 20 years on, in Common Market Law Review, 52(3), 2015, 629 ff. 
33 C. Hillion, Brexit means Br(EEA)xit: The UK withdrawal from the EU and its implications for 
the EEA, in Common Market Law Review, 55(1), 2018, 135 ff. 
34 C. Sanna, Gli accordi tra Svizzera e Unione europea: un modello per le future relazioni con il 
Regno Unito?, in Federalismi.it, 18, 2017, 1-23; M. Condinanzi (a cura di), Unione europea e 
Svizzera tra cooperazione e integrazione, Milano, 2012. 
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guaranteeing access (on a reciprocal basis) to the internal markets of the 
Contracting Parties. These agreements were negotiated at different times, 
starting with the 1972 Free Trade Agreement.35 To date, the system of 
agreements between the European Union and Switzerland includes the 1972 
Free Trade Agreement and five subsequent agreements, which deal with the 
following issues: free movement of persons, land transport, air transport, mutual 
recognition in the field of conformity assessment / technical barriers to trade, 
agriculture. 
The original 1972 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union 
and Switzerland establishes a free trade area between the customs territories of 
the two contracting parties. It primarily focuses on the free movement of goods, 
based on the model of the European internal market. Within this area, industrial 
products and agricultural products originating in the territory of each of the 
Contracting Parties may circulate without the application of customs duties. The 
application of quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect in the 
commercial relations between the two Parties is also prohibited. The free trade 
agreement between the EU and Switzerland also provides for the free movement 
of services and, to a more limited extent, for the free movement of persons. 
The Turkish model, similarly to the Swiss one, does not consist of a single 
trade agreement between the Parties, but in a series of agreements and decisions 
that have given rise to a complex system of preferential bilateral trade relations 
between the European Union and Turkey (EU –Turkey Bilateral Preferential 
Trade Framework – BPTF).36 Trade relations between the Parties have 
developed since the 1960s and have been marked by several stages. The first 
agreement concluded between the Parties was the 1963 Association Agreement 
between the European Union and Turkey, commonly referred to as the Ankara 
Agreement, which initiated the process for the establishment of a customs union 
between the Parties.37 This agreement represents the reference basis for the 
economic and commercial cooperation relations between the Parties. The Ankara 
Agreement was then supplemented by the 1970 Additional Protocol, which set 
up the roadmap for the progressive elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade.38 Finally, the customs union between the Parties was established a few 
 
35 1972 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Switzerland, (Accordo tra la 
Confederazione Svizzera e la Comunità economica europea - Abkommen zwischen der 
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft - Accord 
entre la Confédération suisse et la Communauté économique européenne), RS.632.401, 22 July 
1972, www.admin.ch/opc/it/classified-compilation/19720195/index.html 
36 F. Hakura, EU–Turkey Customs Union. Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit, in 
Chatam House Briefing, December 2018, www.chathamhouse.org; K. Binder, Reinvigorating 
EU-Turkey bilateral trade: Upgrading the customs union, European Parliament Briefing PE 
599.319, 2017. 
37 1963 Ankara Agreement, Agreement creating an association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey (Ankara Agreement), 12 September 1963, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L217, 29 December 1964, 2687. 
38 1970 Additional Protocol, Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 
November 1970, annexed to the Agreement establishing the Association between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey and on measures to be taken for their entry 
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years later, through Decision 1/95 of the EU / Turkey Association Council and 
entered into force from 1996.39 
The key feature of the trade relations between the European Union and 
Turkey is represented by the customs union, which provides for the elimination 
of customs duties and measures having an effect equivalent to the exchange of 
goods between the Parties, as well as for the application by Turkey in its 
relations trade with third countries of the European Union common customs 
tariff. The customs union between the EU and Turkey initially referred to 
industrial products only. It was extended to the coal and steel sector in 1996,40 
and to agricultural and fisheries products in 1998.41  
However, the application of the customs union in question is not immune 
from difficulties, especially due to the asymmetrical nature of the relations 
between Turkey and other EU trade partners.42 Moreover, such a trade relation 
has very peculiar features, since the commercial relations between the Parties are 
rather advanced in the field of free movement of goods, while they are severely 
limited, if not completely absent, in the area of free movement of services and 
persons. For these reasons, it may be very difficult to replicate the provisions 
which shape the trade relations between the EU and Turkey in a different 
context. 
As to the second reference paradigm mentioned above, namely the trade 
liberalization paradigm, its main objective is to promote the liberalization of 
trade between countries. This largely differs with respect to the first paradigm 
seen above. In fact, the trade liberalization objective is pursued by the Parties by 
keeping their national markets separate, rather placing them in a perspective of 
mutual integration. 
The trade liberalization approach usually focuses on trade related to goods 
and extends to the progressive reduction or elimination of barriers to trade, both 
tariff and non-tariff ones, according to WTO rules and criteria. As regards tariff 
obstacles, the trend in the most advanced trade agreements is towards the total 
elimination of tariffs against products originating in the countries with which a 
Party decides to conclude a preferential trade agreement (PTA). Usually this 
kind of agreement creates a free trade area, established in accordance with the 
provisions of article XXIV of the GATT. 
 
into force - Final Act – Declarations, Official Journal of the European Union, L 293, 29 
December 1972, 3–56. 
39 Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on 
implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 
OJ L 35, 13 February 1996, 1–46 
40 Agreement between the European Coal and Steel Community and the Republic of Turkey 
on trade in products covered by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, Official Journal of the European Union, L 227, 07 September 1996, 3-34. 
41 Decision No 1/98 of the Association Council of 25 February 1998 (EC-Turkey trade 
agreement for agricultural products), Official Journal of the European Union, L 86, 20 
March 1998, 1-38. 
42 F. Hakura, EU–Turkey Customs Union. Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit, 
cit.; K. Binder, Reinvigorating EU-Turkey bilateral trade: Upgrading the customs union, cit. 
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The elimination of non-tariff barriers is more difficult, insofar these are 
closely linked to the regulatory power of the various countries. Normally, 
according to WTO rules, not all forms of differentiated national regulation that 
may have a direct or indirect impact on trade are prohibited, but only the 
national provisions that have a clear discriminatory intent or effect against 
products manufactured in a different country are banned. In this sense, the legal 
system set up in the European single market is an exception, in which the Court 
of Justice generally considers inadmissible all the national provisions of the 
Member States which can “directly or indirectly, actually or potentially hinder” 
trade between the various Member States, without it being necessary to provide 
evidence of their effective and relevant impact on intra-European trade. 
In the current global context, characterized by a general trend towards the 
progressive reduction and elimination of tariff obstacles in the international 
trade in goods, the most significant problem to be faced is the control and 
elimination of non-tariff barriers. In this case, it should be underlined that the 
system established with the European internal market constitutes an unmatched 
reference model at a global level, since in addition to guaranteeing the full 
integration of the national markets of the contracting countries, it provides for a 
high level of regulatory integration for the Parties. This level of regulatory 
integration is far more advanced than the one that can be found in any kind of 
bilateral free trade agreements existing worldwide, including some of the most 
recent ones concluded by the European Union, such as for instance those with 
Canada, South Korea, Japan. These agreements, in fact, provide for a very 
significant level of market integration, which, however, does not go as far as to 
establish an advanced model of regulatory integration between the Parties 
comparable with the European internal market. 
Within the preferential trade agreements, sometimes the liberalization of 
trade is also extended to the services sector, with a varying intensity, depending 
on the specific type of agreement. In some cases, the liberalization of trade in 
services may be accompanied by a limited freedom of movement for persons, 
usually understood as a limited free movement of service providers. 
In the context of the liberalization of trade in services, the question of the 
liberalization of tariff measures does not arise, as measures of this type are 
normally absent. For this reason, with reference to services, the main problem 
concerns the control of non-tariff measures. Free trade agreements extending to 
services may contain measures designed to promote the approximation of the 
national provisions of the Contracting Parties on services, but generally do not 
go as far as to undermine the general principle according to which the regulation 
of services constitutes a topic reserved to the national regulatory competence of 
each sovereign country. In fact, this matter is normally excluded from the 
harmonization efforts promoted at international level, both in bilateral and in 
multilateral contexts. The exception in this sense is represented by the European 
internal market, in which the regulatory integration on the free movement of 
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goods is also accompanied by a broad, albeit less evolved, regulatory integration 
on the free movement of services. 
The most advanced bilateral trade agreement model that is an expression 
of the trade liberalization paradigm is represented by the free trade agreement 
concluded in 2016 between the European Union and Canada, called the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).43 This agreement is 
the most advanced example of a free trade agreement (FTA) concluded to date 
by the Union. 
The CETA agreement provides for the establishment of a free trade area 
which includes both the free movement of goods, pursuant to art. XXIV of the 
GATT, and the free movement of services, pursuant to art. V of the GATS. In 
fact, the peculiarity of this agreement lies in the coexistence, within the same 
legal instrument, of a “complex” free trade area, where the free movement of 
goods, which represents the traditional content of free trade agreements, is 
accompanied by the free movement of services. However, this agreement does 
not contain provisions relating to the free movement of persons, with the 
exception of temporary movements of persons who provide services in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. 
Chapter II of the CETA agreement regulates the free movement of goods. 
It provides for a gradual reduction and progressive elimination of customs duties 
on the import of goods originating in the other Contracting Party and the 
prohibition on introducing or maintaining prohibitions or restrictions on the 
import of goods from the customs territory of the other Party or on the export 
towards that territory, in line with the provisions of art. XI of the GATT. In 
general, all the provisions of this chapter of the agreement are largely based on 
the corresponding GATT rules and incorporate its fundamental principles. 
As for the free movement of services, this is governed by Chapter IX of the 
CETA agreement, which provides for a broad regime of free movement of 
services between the Parties, with particular reference to some specifically 
identified sectors. For example, it includes legal or accounting consultancy 
services, as well as those provided in the transport, telecommunications and 
tourism sectors. Conversely, the air transport sector, as well as those of 
audiovisual services (for the European Union) and culture (for Canada) are 
excluded. Overall, it can be said that the CETA agreement is the expression of a 
broad agenda of liberalization of the provision of services between the Parties. 
As for the movement of persons, Chapter X of the CETA agreement 
contains specific rules on the right of temporary entry and stay of natural 
persons of one Party in the territory of the other Party, provided that this occurs 
in connection with the provision of services. In addition, Chapter XI establishes 
a legal framework for the negotiation of future agreements between the Parties 
aimed at the mutual recognition of their professional qualifications. 
 
43 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the other part, (Accordo CETA), 2016, in GUUE 
L 11, 14 January 2017, 23-1079. 
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In conclusion, it can be argued that the CETA agreement, as an example of 
an advanced FTA agreement, which also provides for the free movement of 
services alongside the free movement of goods, is probably the most interesting 
source of inspiration for defining the future relations between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union. 
4. The “level playing field” (LPF) criterion 
In this paragraph, the question of the “level playing field” (LPF)44 criterion will 
be analyzed, with a particular regard to the provisions of the Political 
Declaration and to negotiating positions of the Parties for the phase two of 
Brexit 45.  
According to the Political Declaration, the LPF should be a fundamental 
criterion for the definition of the future commercial relations between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union, in order to avoid the possible negative 
consequences that could result from regulatory discrepancies between the 
Parties in the definition of competition, environmental, social and tax standards. 
The LPF criterion refers to a situation in which the conditions of competition for 
all economic operators operating in a given market are fair. This term is usually 
used in the context of the application of the respective national regulatory 
standards of the Parties to a free trade agreement to some horizontal sectors, 
such as those relating to business taxation, labor standards, environmental 
protection standards and climate change policies. 
The LPF criterion may consist in the application of two different 
approaches: the first “softer” one corresponding to the principle of non-
regression and the second “stricter” one relating to the principle of dynamic 
regulatory alignment of the various Contracting Parties to an international trade 
agreement46. The first criterion (non-regression)47 is a common feature in some 
recent free trade agreements, such as those concluded by the European Union 
with Canada, South Korea and Japan. The second criterion (dynamic regulatory 
alignment)48 is often applied in the commercial relations of the European Union 
with some neighboring countries, in the context of its neighborhood policy. The 
main example of the application of the regulatory alignment is represented by 
 
44 F. Zuleeg (et al.), Ensuring a post-Brexit level playing field, European Policy Centre (EPC), 
May 2019, www.epc.eu/en/publications/Ensuring-a-post-Brexit-level-playing-field~26c1e0 
45 M. Morris, Level playing field, IPPR briefing, The Progressive Policy Think Tank, 18 
February 2020, www.ippr.org/blog/level-playing-field-ippr-briefing 
46 D. Loud, Defining Withdrawal: Brexit and the “Level Playing Field” for Environmental 
Regulations, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, blogs2.law.columbia.edu/jtl/tag/daniel-
loud/ 
47 M. Prieur, Non-regression in environmental law, S.A.P.I.EN.S (Online), 5(2), 2012, 
journals.openedition.org/sapiens/1405 
48 K. Armstrong, Regulatory alignment and divergence after Brexit, in Journal of European Public 
Policy (JEPP), 25(8), 2018, 1099-1117. 
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the provisions of the EEA Agreement, but similar examples can also be found in 
other recent EU agreements, such as the one with Ukraine. 
The LPF issue was already present in the first period of the Brexit 
negotiations, which culminated with the first version of Withdrawal Agreement 
and the related Political Declaration concluded in November 2018. In this 
context, the only explicit reference to the LPF criterion was contained in the 
Protocol relating to Ireland / Northern Ireland annexed to the Withdrawal 
Agreement. In fact, in article 6 of this Protocol, it is written that in order to 
facilitate the exchange of goods within the common customs area during the 
transition phase, between the Brexit date and the deadline of 31 December 2020, 
the level playing field criterion will be applied between the Parties, with 
reference to their competition laws, their fiscal system, as well as their 
environmental, social and labor standards. In addition, Annex 4 to the said 
Protocol provides that for environmental, social and labor standards, the 
principle of non-regression applies, with reference to the common criteria and 
rules in force for the Parties at the end of the transition period provided by the 
Withdrawal Agreement. As for the progressive update of the relevant common 
standards, article 6 of the Protocol states that the Joint Committee in charge 
with the implementation of the future agreement between the Parties will enjoy 
the competence to modify the conditions of the level playing field and to  adopt 
higher and more stringent standards. 
After the resumption of negotiations between the Parties following the 
appointment of the Government of Boris Johnson, the reference to the level 
playing field criterion has been widely changed, both in its location and in its 
content. As for the location, the reference has been moved from the above 
mentioned Protocol relating to Ireland / Northern Ireland to the Political 
Declaration, in its revised version of October 2019. As for the content, the 
criterion has assumed the role of a general guideline for the regulation of the 
future commercial relations between the Parties after Brexit, as better explained 
below. 
The LPF criterion is explicitly referred to in paragraph 77 of the Political 
Declaration, in its revised version of October 201949. This provision contains a 
commitment of the Parties to guarantee in their future relations the application 
of a common level playing field. This should aim at ensuring an open and fair 
competition system, which can guarantee to economic and commercial operators 
of both Parties to compete on the same terms in the future integrated market 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
The commitment to maintaining a common (high) level playing field refers 
to the internal regulations of the Parties regarding competition policy and state 
aids, social and labor standards, environmental protection and climate change, 
and fiscal policy. However, there is a reference in paragraph 77, according to 
which the precise nature of the respective commitments of the Parties on their 
 
49 Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom (2019/C 66 I/02), cit, para. 77. 
 The post-Brexit negotiations and the level playing field criterion 
 
 
DPCE online, 2020/1 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
185 
common level of regulation will depend on the scope and depth of their future 
relationship and on the level of their economic connectedness. Furthermore, in 
paragraph 77 there is no reference to the possibility of a verification of the 
implementation of the LPF criterion by the governing entity that will take care 
of the management of the future agreement between the Parties and may resolve 
the related disputes. 
The latter two elements could represent a very relevant weakness of 
paragraph 77. In fact, it seems that there are no effective guarantees that the 
United Kingdom will in any case respect the generic commitment contained in 
the Political Declaration to maintain a level playing field with the European 
Union. It is in fact absolutely possible that, during the phase two negotiations, 
the United Kingdom will try to use the provision in question in order to push 
towards the conclusion of a commercial agreement with the European Union 
more favorable to it, otherwise threatening to become a paradise of deregulation 
in tax, social and environmental matters, located at the gates of the European 
Union. Moreover, it is equally possible that, even in case a free trade agreement 
governing the future commercial relations between the Parties is concluded, the 
United Kingdom, when confronted with its implementation, may nevertheless 
decide to adopt a policy which tends to be less restrictive than the European one, 
thus putting at risk the concrete application of the level playing field criterion. 
The European Union, in its negotiating position for phase two of Brexit50, 
has introduced a section specifically dedicated to the issue of the level playing 
field51. In this section, the Union refers to the provisions of the Political 
Declaration, according to which “the envisaged partnership must ensure open 
and fair competition, encompassing robust commitments to ensure a level 
playing field”52. According to the European Union, the agreement with the 
United Kingdom on the future relations between the Parties should confirm the 
current high common standards “in the areas of State aid, competition, state-
owned enterprises, social and employment standards, environmental standards, 
climate change, relevant tax matters and other regulatory measures and 
practices in these areas”53.  
Similarly, the standards of the Parties in the sectors indicated above should 
remain high and should have European Union standards as a reference point, 
taking into account how these will evolve in the future. Furthermore, according 
to the EU, the governing body of the future agreement between the Parties 
should have the competence to modify the joint commitments regarding the level 
playing field, with the power to subject new sectors to the criterion in question 
or to introduce stricter standards over time54. 
 
50 Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement, cit. 
51 Ibidem, para. 93 ff. 
52 Ibidem, para. 94. 
53 Ibidem, para. 94. 
54 Ibidem, para. 94-95. 
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As for the United Kingdom, there is no specific reference to the level 
playing field criterion in its post-Brexit negotiating positions55. However, there 
are relevant provisions in this sense in the sections dedicated to competition 
policy and to the relationship between trade and other relevant interests related 
to sustainable development, social and employment protection, environmental 
protection and fiscal policy56. 
In particular, with reference to competition policy, according to the United 
Kingdom, the Parties should undertake to maintain their own effective system of 
competition laws, without this requiring their legislative or regulatory 
alignment57. 
With reference to the standards for social, labor and environmental 
protection, the United Kingdom proposes the insertion in the agreement 
between the Parties of a clause aimed at establishing a mutual commitment not 
to lower or reduce the protection standards, in order to encourage trade and 
investment58. Such a proposal is based on the principle of non-regression, as 
contained in many recent European Union free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
non-European countries, such as those concluded with South Korea and Japan. 
However, the limit inherent to such an approach is that the application of the 
non-regression principle is not conceived as an absolute obligation, but it only 
imposes to the Parties a reciprocal commitment conditional to the promotion of 
trade and investment. 
On the basis of what has just been examined regarding the possible role of 
the LPF criterion in the context of the future economic and commercial relations 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it can be concluded that, 
at present, in view of the provisions of the 2019 Political Declaration and given 
the respective negotiating positions for phase two of Brexit, as expressed by the 
Parties in February 2020, it is difficult to argue that the criterion under 
consideration will constitute a guarantee against the possibility that one of the 
two Parties, more likely the United Kingdom, decides to promote a race to the 
bottom in the definition of the standards in the areas covered by the application 
of the said criterion. 
5. Conclusion  
In this article, the main features of the future trade relations between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union were firstly examined, based on the most 
relevant documents that marked the negotiations between the Parties between 
2017 and 2019. From the analysis carried out, and in particular from the Political 
Declaration of 2018-2019, very precise hints on the future commercial relations 
between the Parties seem to emerge. The Parties, in fact, seem to be moving 
 
55 HM Government, The Future Relationship with the EU. The UK’s Approach to 
Negotiations, cit. 
56 Ibidem, Part 1, chapters 21 and 25-28.  
57 Ibidem, Part 1, chapter 21, para. 66. 
58 Ibidem, Part 1, chapters 26-27, paras. 75-78. 
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towards the conclusion of a free trade agreement, in which a wide free movement 
of goods will be ensured, where there will be room for some free movement of 
services and a more limited chance for free movement of capital and payments, 
whilst the movement of persons will be greatly limited. 
Subsequently, the two paradigms that normally inspire the Union's 
relations with its trade counterparts and which are likely to influence the 
definition of future trade relations between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union have been examined. These paradigms correspond on the one 
hand to the imperative of market integration and on the other hand to the one of 
trade liberalization. In addition, some relevant models, drawn up in 
implementation of the aforementioned two paradigms, which currently connect 
the European Union to some of its most important commercial partners have 
been presented and analyzed. They are the Norwegian model, the Swiss model, 
the Turkish model and the Canadian model.  
The analysis conducted above has shown that, at the beginning of phase 
two of the Brexit negotiations, the Parties look inspired by the trade 
liberalization paradigm rather than by the market integration one. This 
preference emerges from the Political Declaration and it is clearly restated by 
the United Kingdom in its negotiating positions, whereas the European Union 
has a less clear-cut position. In fact, on the one side, it seems to acknowledge 
that the trade liberalization paradigm looks like the most appropriate one for 
shaping the future trade relations with the UK, while on the other side appears 
to be looking for a solution which takes into account the specificity of the United 
Kingdom as a peculiar trade partner, which is quite different from other 
countries with which the EU has recently concluded trade agreements shaped by 
the trade liberalization paradigm, such as for instance Canada, South Korea and 
Japan. This peculiarity of the UK vis-à-vis the EU is due to two main reasons: its 
geographical proximity and its nature of a former Member State. However, 
despite these specific circumstances, which make the UK different from any other 
trade partner, it emerges that the most relevant model for shaping the future 
EU-UK trade relations is represented by the recent CETA Agreement that 
connects the European Union with Canada, which is to date the most advanced 
example of PTA ever concluded by the Union.     
Finally, the analysis conducted above has focused on the “level playing 
field” criterion, which may come into play in the definition of the regulatory 
standards of the Parties, in the field of competition policy and state aids, 
environmental protection, social and labor regulations and fiscal matters. It has 
emerged that the future application of the respective standards of the Parties in 
these fields could reserve some difficulties and surprises, in particular for the 
European Union. This is due to the fact that, despite the generic commitment of 
the Parties, contained in paragraph 77 of the 2019 revised Political Declaration, 
to promote the application of a common level playing field in their future 
relations, there are no real guarantees that the United Kingdom, after Brexit, 
will be able to resist to the temptation to become a champion of deregulation. In 
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other words, it is not possible to exclude that the UK will not tend to deregulate 
in the fiscal, social and environmental sectors, with the intent, or in any case 
with the effect, to create a competitive advantage for its economic and 
commercial operators.  
In order to minimize such risk, the European Union should carefully 
conduct the negotiations during phase two of Brexit, focusing on two main 
objectives. In the first place, the EU should try to steer the application of the 
level playing field criterion towards a dynamic regulatory alignment approach 
rather than simply towards a non-regression commitment. In the second place, 
the European Union should aim to guarantee a proper application of the level 
playing field criterion by trying to make the UK agree on the insertion in the 
trade agreement between the Parties of a clause empowering the Joint 
Committee or a similar body in charge with monitoring the application of the 
agreement with some specific competence for the periodical review and update of 
the pertinent standards as well as the resolution of the relevant disputes between 
the Parties. If this will occur, the application of the level playing field criterion 
may become a meaningful instrument to create a truly “ambitious, wide-ranging 
and balanced economic partnership” between the EU and the UK, as stated in the 
Political Declaration. Otherwise, the planned trade agreement between the 
Parties runs the risk of being not very dissimilar to the other PTAs which 
already connect the EU with some of its relevant non-European trading 
partners.  
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